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from Australian Securities Exchange 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the claims of superiority of fundamental indexation strategy over 
capitalisation-weighted indexation by using data for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
listed stocks. Whilst our results are in line with the outperformance observed in other 
geographical markets, we find that the excess returns from fundamental indexation in 
Australian market are much higher. On a rolling 5-year basis, the fundamental index always 
outperforms the capitalisation-weighted index. Our results suggest that superior 
performance of fundamental indexation could not be entirely attributed to value, size, or 
momentum effects. The outperformance persists even after adjusting for slightly higher 
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1. Introduction 
Passive portfolio management has gained in popularity over last few decades. Prior to the 
1960s, the conventional wisdom was professional money managers were able to generate 
‘above average’ returns owing to their superior skills compared to the lay investor. Since 
then, academic research in financial economics has increasingly unearthed evidence to the 
contrary. The inability of a vast majority of actively managed funds to consistently 
outperform the market has put a serious question mark over the claim of their possessing 
superior skills. That active investing involves much higher transaction costs and 
management fees has also made them less appealing. This has resulted in significant growth 
of investments in passively managed index funds. Vanguard, an investment management 
company that specialises in index funds, managed assets worth $1.4 trillion worldwide (of 
which $80 billion is in Australia alone) as of June 2010 (Vanguard, 2010). The Vanguard 
500 Index fund, which made its debut in 1976 and tracks the S&P 500 index, is now one of 
the largest equity funds in the world.  
Index funds tracking market capitalisation based indices like S&P 500 are the most well 
known form of passive management. However whether they are the most efficient 
investment vehicles available has been open to question.  One alternative form of indexation 
that is currently attracting a lot of attention is the fundamental indexation strategy proposed 
by Arnott, Hsu, Moore (2005) (hereafter AHM). They argue that if stock prices are too 
noisy relative to their fundamentals, then by construction market capitalisation-weighted 
(cap-weighted) indexes would suffer from a price drag by becoming overweight in shares 
that are overpriced and underweight in shares that are underpriced relative to their fair 
value. The authors propose a non-capitalisation based indexing that assigns weight on stocks 
based on alternative measures of size like sales, cash flow, book value and dividends. They 
call this fundamental indexation as weighting of stocks is based on accounting measures as 
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proxies of fundamental value. Their study finds that such a strategy outperforms cap-
weighted strategy based on US market data over a period of 43 years. 
Since the publication of the AHM study, fundamental indexation has drawn significant 
interest from academics and practitioners. While there has been some support for the 
fundamental indexing strategy in other markets, controversy has emerged on different 
fronts. The main criticism has been that it is actually a value strategy in disguise and does 
little beyond capturing the value premium. Questions have also been raised on the higher 
turnover costs of fundamental indexing compared to tracking a cap-weighted index as the 
latter requires very little rebalancing. 
In this paper, we investigate fundamental indexation strategy with data from the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) over a period of 25 years between 1985 and 2010. With respect 
to the superiority of fundamental indexation over cap-weighted indexation, our results are 
broadly supportive of the findings of the AHM study. However, like some other subsequent 
studies, we find the fundamental indexation strategy to underperform during strong bull 
markets although this effect diminishes with longer time horizons. Overall, our findings 
indicate that fundamental indexation could offer potential outperformance of cap-weighted 
indexation even after adjusting for slightly higher transaction costs related to turnover. 
Our paper makes two important contributions. First, the bulk of research on fundamental 
indexation has been conducted using data for the US and European markets. Mar, Bird, 
Casavecchia, and Yeung (2009), the only study to have examined fundamental indexation in 
the Australian market, covered a limited period from 1995 to 2006 which, by the authors’ 
own admission, characterised a ‘value period’ in the Australian stock market. Our coverage 
of the 25-year period between 1985 and 2010 captures significant market downturns of 1987 
and more recent crisis of 2008-2009. Thus it allows for a richer analysis through varied 
economic conditions and stock market cycles and testing whether prior results on various 
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aspects of fundamental indexation still hold up. Our results show that the excess returns 
derived from investing in fundamental indexation strategy in the Australian market is 
substantially higher than what has been observed in the US and European markets and not 
entirely explained by the risk factors commonly used in finance literature. 
Second, we show that the excess returns of fundamental indexation over cap-weighted 
indexation are not explained by value, size, or momentum factors. This is in stark contrast to 
several past empirical studies in the US (e.g. Jun and Malkiel, 2008; Blitz and Swinkel, 
2009) and international markets (e.g. Estrada, 2006) that find the superior performance of 
fundamental indexation could be mainly attributed to its value tilt. Similarly, the only 
previous study of fundamental indexation in Australian market by Mar et al. (2009) found 
that its superiority is explained by increased exposure to value stocks. Our evidence is not 
supportive of this claim and suggests the need for further research about the source of 
outperformance.  
2. Background and Prior Research 
Fundamental indexation is based on accounting valuation measures. The use of accounting 
data for security selection is not a new practice among investors. In fact, it greatly predates 
academic research in this area by many decades. There is anecdotal evidence of analysts 
(then known as statisticians) in Wall Street using limited accounting information of 
companies in asset valuation. Benjamin Graham, widely regarded as the pioneer of security 
analysis, used mainly accounting figures as the basis for stock selection. Graham and 
Dodd’s book ‘Security Analysis’, which first went in print on 1934, emphasized the use of 
sales, earnings, dividends, current assets, book value, and cash in determining whether 
stocks of individual companies are overvalued or undervalued. This approach is commonly 
known as fundamental analysis and is about finding the fundamental or intrinsic value of a 
company’s stock based on information reported in financial statements. 
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In recent years, there has been renewed interest in stock selection based on accounting data 
motivated by research confirming post-earnings announcement drift in security prices. Ou 
and Penman (1989) show the existence of significant abnormal returns to an investment 
strategy that is based on the prediction of the sign of future changes in earnings per share 
(EPS) which they forecast using an exhaustive list of accounting ratios describing leverage, 
activity, and profitability. Similarly, Holthausen and Larcker (1992) find evidence of 
abnormal returns using a predictive model based on accounting ratios. Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1998) demonstrate that an investment strategy based on the fundamental signals 
extracted from financial statements like change in inventories, accounts receivables, gross 
margin among others, generate abnormal returns. Piotroski (2000) provides further evidence 
supporting the predictive ability of historical accounting signals about future stock price 
changes for a sample of value stocks (i.e. stocks with high book-to-market ratio). These 
results suggest that historical accounting information can predict future stock performance. 
Modern finance, however, takes a dim view of the attempt to use past information in making 
profitable investment decisions. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) all 
available information is already incorporated in the current market prices of securities. This 
rules out the possibility of generating abnormal returns using information that is already 
available to investor, which includes accounting data. Under the framework of the well 
known capital market asset pricing model CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) the 
market portfolio i.e. a portfolio which holds securities weighted by their market 
capitalisation is shown to be mean-variance efficient. Therefore, to beat the cap-weighted 
market index investors must hold a portfolio that is riskier than the market portfolio. 
From the efficient market perspective, it is remarkable that the AHM study of 2005 puts 
forward an indexing strategy based on fundamental metrics derived from historical 
accounting data that so easily outperforms the cap-weighted market portfolio on a risk-
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adjusted basis. The authors create a composite index called the ‘fundamental index’ by 
combining the four metrics of book value, sales, cash flow and dividends. They find that, 
between 1964 and 2002, the fundamental index outperforms the comparable cap-weighted 
index (S&P 500) by almost 2% per annum while displaying the same volatility as the latter. 
Treynor (2005) shows that the return drag on a market cap-weighted index is approximately 
equal to the noise in stock prices. Siegel (2006) also suggests that as stock prices are subject 
to noise, cap-weighted indexes would prove inferior to that of the fundamental index as 
portfolio construction technique. 
Tamura and Shimizu (2005) construct global fundamental indexes using the same composite 
index metrics as AHM and find that it exceeds the returns of the cap-weighted MSCI World 
and FTSE Developed indexes with lower volatility between 1988 and 2005. Estrada (2008) 
also applies fundamental indexation technique to international diversification by giving each 
country a weight according to its dividend per share and then measuring the portfolio 
performance (using country ETFs as the investable security). The findings suggest that over 
a 32-year (1974-2005) period, the dividend-weighted fundamental index outperformed the 
cap-weighted index on an absolute as well as on a risk-adjusted basis. However, the author 
also found that a simple value strategy based on dividend yield would have outperformed 
the fundamental indexation strategy for the same period. Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010) use 
data from 1982 to 2008 to create a global fundamental index as well as individual country 
indexes for 28 developed and 22 emerging markets. Although they find evidence of global 
fundamental index outperforming global cap-weighted index, the evidence for 
outperformance of individual country-specific indexes is not compelling. 
One of the main critiques of fundamental indexation is that it is a strategy to capture value 
premium already well documented in literature (Ball, 1978; Stattman, 1980; Fama and 
French, 1992) but is not as effective at capturing the value effect as an intentional value tilt 




 Jun and Malkiel (2008) examines the returns of the fundamental index and 
conclude that the methodology does not add any value above that which is explained by the 
Fama and French three-factor model.  Blitz and Swinkels (2009) critique follows the same 
line – that fundamental indexation is simply an active value strategy. They find that more 
sophisticated quantitative strategies, capturing more than one market anomaly, may provide 
a better risk-return profile for investors. Amenc, Goultz and Le Sourd (2009) show that 
when this value bias is adjusted for, the published fundamental index RAFI 1000 Index does 
not outperform the cap-weighted index. Perold (2007) criticises the assertion by 
fundamental index proponents that one can outperform the cap-weighted index without 
knowing fair value and argues that the fundamental index performance suffers in conditions 
of persistent mispricing or under-reacting stock prices.  
The only published study to investigate fundamental indexation exclusively in the 
Australian stock market is Mar, Bird, Casavecchia and Yeung (2009). They create 
fundamental index portfolios on the metrics of book value-to-equity, 3-year rolling average 
cash flows and 3-year rolling average revenue for the period 1995 to 2006. They find that 
the composite fundamental index outperforms the cap-weighted market portfolio by an 
average of 1.93% per year. The only time it is found to underperform is during the “tech 
bubble”. Using the Carhart four-factor model, the authors find that the fundamental index 
exhibits a significant value bias, while size and momentum are not significant factors in the 
explaining the excess return. Finally, their paper demonstrates that the fundamental index is 
not disadvantaged by liquidity and turnover. The effect of transaction costs is examined and 
it is found that a 1% transaction cost is not sufficient to negate the excess return.  
Some of the global research on fundamental indexation covers Australia by default. For 
example, Tamura and Shimizu (2005) holds a fundamental-weighted portfolio of 80 
                                                             
1 Some critiques argue that, apart from value premium, it is also an attempt to capture size premium (Banz, 
1981) to a small extent. 
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Australian stocks from January 1988 to August 2005. They found the Australian region 
index to outperform the benchmark on a statistically significant basis with a beta of less than 
one. Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010) also find that the fundamental index portfolio in Australia 
was one of the few that beat the benchmark at a statistically significant level after 
controlling for data snooping.   
3. Data and Index Construction 
Our dataset covers a period of 25 years between April 1985 and March 2010. It includes 
data on returns of ASX listed companies as well as on a range of fundamental measures like 
sales, book value (BV), operating profit (OP), dividends, and employee numbers. The data 
on fundamental measures for individual companies used in this study was drawn from the 
Aspect Huntley and Worldscope (Factset) databases. Stock price and returns are from 
Standard and Poors (S&P), but where S&P data was unavailable, Factset data was used. The 
use of two databases of company fundamentals is to assist with error-checking and allows 
for a longer testing period than previous studies like Mar et al. (2009) as Worldscope data is 
available from 1985. The AHM study makes the points that by reweighting a cap-weighted 
index, stocks with strong fundamentals but low market capitalisation may be excluded; 
likewise, companies with poor fundamentals but high capitalisation may get included. To 
avoid such possibilities, we start with the universe of all stocks listed on the ASX at the time 
of reconstitution each year.  
Fundamental indexes are constructed individually on each of the following measures.2 
1) Sales (Net) 
2) Book value (minus intangibles) 
3) Operating income 
4) Total dividend paid 
                                                             
2 The only study of fundamental indexation in the Australian market, Mar et al. (2009), employed only three 
measures - book value, operating income, and revenue.  
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5) Net payout 
6) Employee numbers 
Most of the above measures are selected from prior fundamental index research. The 
original AHM study used book value, operating income, revenue, dividends, and 
employment to form indexes. Other authors tested various combinations among these 
fundamental metrics in different markets. We use ‘book value (minus intangibles)’ measure 
to obtain a more tangible evaluation of company size than the book value measure used in 
the AHM construction The ‘net payout’ metric used in this paper was earlier used by 
Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010). The idea behind using it is that net payout (defined as 
dividends plus cash paid for stock buybacks and minus cash received for stock issuances) 
might be a better representation of company size than pure dividends.
3
  
At the end of March every year, fundamental indexes are formed and held for 12 months 
and then rebalanced. Three indexes are constructed for each measure using trailing 5 years’ 
average data, trailing 3 years’ average data and the latest data. In line with the AHM 
construction methodology, the 3-year and 5-year indexes take a simple average of the 
trailing data for each company. However, where a data field is blank for a certain year, the 
average is taken of the available data.4 The companies are then ranked on the absolute value 
of the fundamental measure each year. Where the absolute value is negative, it is given a 0 
value in order to hold only long positions within the index. The top 200 companies by each 
measure are used to construct the fundamental indexes. Companies within each index are 
weighted in accordance with the magnitude of the respective fundamental measures.  
                                                             
3 Data for franking levels is not available until 1997, and therefore a “grossed-up dividend paid” or “grossed-
up dividend paid plus buybacks” factor were excluded from this research. However, as the Australian 
imputation taxation system has an impact on the payment of dividends by distributing companies, it would be 
a worthwhile factor to include in future studies. 
4 This differs to the treatment of a data field for which the value is zero. Any field that had a value is included 
in the trailing average. 
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It is to be noted that in some of the earlier years in our sample period, data is available for 
less than 200 companies. In these cases, all companies are included in the index in a 
weighted manner. There are a number of reasons for using the top 200 companies in 
constructing the fundamental indexes. First, the performance could be compared with the 
benchmark S&P ASX200, the most popular cap-weighted index in Australian market. 
Second, the Australian fundamental index portfolios run by both Realindex Investments and 
FTSE are made of 200 companies. Finally, while using more companies would be more 
representative of the Australian market in later years of our sample period but data in the 
earlier years is limited. Consistent with the FTSE RAFI index construction methodology, 




We also construct a composite index by combining the individual fundamental measures. 
Prior research papers of fundamental indexation used different combinations of individual 
fundamental measures, numbers of measures and trailing average periods for their 
composite index. As Arnott and West (2006) explain, the reasoning behind having a number 
of measures rather than just one is that each metric has a bias. For example, the ‘dividend 
paid’ metric has a bias towards established companies while the ‘employee number’ metric 
has a bias to large companies and places the same importance on a shelf-stacker as a 
biological scientist. Similarly, the ‘sales’ metric may be inconsistent across industries (such 
as financial services) and a portfolio based on ‘profits’ metric may overweight and 
underweight companies with highly cyclical income.  
Four fundamental measures - book value (minus intangibles), net sales, operating income 
and net payment - are being used for the composite portfolio to be consistent with prior 
research, which used between three and five fundamental measures in their composite index. 
                                                             
5 The AHM study does examine rebalancing on a more frequent basis and found that the results were similar 
but with increased turnover. 
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Four measures seem sufficient to balance the biases from individual measures, but not so 
many that the transparency and repeatability of the process is eliminated. The employee 
numbers metric is excluded from the composite portfolio, due to the lack of data available, 
the errors in the source data and the fact that companies have not consistently reported 
employee numbers. 
For the first measure, book value (minus intangibles) we use the latest data, rather than 
rolling averages, to ensure that it is representative of any significant changes to firm size as 
a result of mergers and acquisitions. For net sales, we use a 5-year trailing average in order 
to avoid substantially higher volatility and turnover. For operating income, a 5-year trailing 
average is used to smooth potential overweights to companies with highly cyclical income. 
Finally, this composite portfolio contains a net payment metric. This is similar to the paper 
of Walkshäusl and Lobe (2010) and based on the testing done by Boudoukh, Michaely, 
Richardson, and Roberts (2007), who find that the stock return predictability in a time-series 
is much stronger when (net) payout yields are used instead of the dividend yield.  
As per the construction for individual indexes, each company is given a weight according to 
their relative size against the top 200 companies by that fundamental measure. For the 
composite index, the company’s weight across the four fundamental metrics is averaged. 
The top two-hundred companies on the average result are taken, and then the weights 
renormalised to equal 1. Equal weighting of each metric is used for the composite portfolio 
for ease of replication and transparency. 
A cap-weighted index is constructed for a fair comparison. Free-float adjusted market 
capitalisation is available from 1993 in the Worldscope database. Like the fundamental 
indexes, the cap-weighted index is constructed from the universe of all stocks listed on the 
ASX at the time of reconstitution. Also, similar to the fundamental indexes, the cap-
weighted index is rebalanced only once a year at the end of March. The end result turns out 
Page 13 of 45 
 
to be quite similar to that of the S&P ASX 200 and performance is highly correlated. The 
cap-weighted index (called reference henceforth) is used in our analysis for the sub-period 
1993-2010. For the full sample period i.e. 1985-2010, we use the ASX 200 Accumulation 
index as the comparator for the fundamental indexes. 
4. Results 
4.1 Performance and Risk-Return Characteristics 
We test the fundamental index portfolios and the cap-weighted reference portfolio on 
performance by calculating monthly returns and comparing them both in terms of absolute 
and risk adjusted basis. To report the latter, we compute Sharpe ratio as per Sharpe (1966).6 
As market capitalisation data for individual companies is not available prior to 1993, there 
are two sets of performance comparisons: one for the entire sample period from 1985 
onwards and another for sub-sample period from 1993 onwards. For the first set of 
comparisons, we compare the performance of individual and composite fundamental 
indexes to the market cap-weighted S&P/ASX 200 (and prior to 31 May 1992, the ASX All 
Ordinaries Accumulation) index, which is the most well known benchmark of the Australian 
stock market. For the sub-sample period commencing from April 1993, we compare the 
performance of individual and composite fundamental indexes to the cap-weighted 
reference portfolio which we construct using the same methodology as that used for the 
fundamental indexes.  
In terms of total returns over the full 25- year period, all the fundamental indexes achieve 
statistically significant outperformance over the S&P/ASX 200 Index.  Similarly, since 1993 
each of the fundamental indexes demonstrates statistically significant outperformance over 
the reference portfolio. Tables 1 and 2 show the performance of different fundamental 
indexes. We present result for only over the full sample and sub-sample period, the 
                                                             
6 We also report ‘alpha’ measures following Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) for 
the composite fundamental index and cap-weighted reference index in section 4.1.4 
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individual fundamental indexes not only generate higher geometric annual returns than the 
cap-weighted indexes, many do so with similar or lower volatility. 
Over the full sample period 1985-2010, the average geometric return for the individual 
fundamental indexes is 15.89%, which is 4.13% higher than the geometric mean return of 
the S&P ASX 200 index. From 1993 onwards, the individual fundamental indexes return 
14.69% per annum on average, which is 3.52% higher than that of the cap-weighted 
reference portfolio. This is much higher than the magnitude of outperformance reported by 
previous studies in different geographical markets.7 We find that the excess returns to be 
statistically significant for all individual and composite fundamental indexes.  
At 15.72%, the average volatility of the fundamental indexes over the full sample period is a 
full 1% lower than that of S&P ASX 200 index. For the sub-sample period commencing 
1993, the difference is much smaller but the average standard deviation of fundamental 
indexes is still 0.41% lower than that of the reference portfolio. This is contrary to Mar et al. 
(2009) who found the volatility of the cap-weighted portfolio in Australia to be slightly 
lower than all of the individual fundamental indexes. However, the Sharpe ratio measures in 
both Mar et al. (2009) and our paper show that all the individual fundamental indexes 
outperform the cap-weighted counterparts on a risk-adjusted basis.  
As in the AHM study, among the individual fundamental indexes, we find the net sales 
portfolios have the highest terminal value. The portfolios formed on the basis of dividends 
and operating profits, on the other hand, fare the poorest but both of them outperform the 
cap-weighted indexes quite easily. Also similar to findings of many past studies, our results 
show that the dividend portfolios have the lowest volatility. This is mainly due to the reason 
that dividend-paying companies are very often large and well-established ‘value’ companies 
with lower risk perception. The results for single year and multi-year fundamental indexes 
                                                             
7 The AHM study finds the fundamental index returns are about 2% higher than the cap-weighted index in 
USA. Stotz et al. (2010) and Mar et al. (2009) report similar magnitude of outperformance for European and 
Australian stocks respectively. 
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are quite similar. With the exception of the dividend indexes, the returns for multi-year 
indexes are marginally higher relative to single year indexes. In terms of volatility of 
returns, however, there is a noticeable decline in all indexes formed with longer period data. 
This suggests that fundamental indexes that are constructed using multi-year data may 
provide superior risk-return profile for investors in most cases. 
As discussed before, the composite index is made up of four equally weighted fundamental 
metrics: 5-year trailing average operating income, net payments, net sales and the latest 
book value (minus intangibles). The performance results of the composite index, the 
individual constituents of the composite index, and the comparable indexes are provided in 
table 3. The performance of the composite index is strong over both time periods relative to 
the two cap-weighted benchmarks. As the figures show, the composite index outperforms 
the cap-weighted index with lower volatility as well as outperforming the average of the 
four individual metrics.  
Having seen the superior risk-return characteristics of the composite index, it is still 
important for investors to know that there can be prolonged periods where the fundamental 
indexes underperform cap-weighted indexes. Chen, Chen and Bassett (2007) points out that 
fundamental weighting would not be profitable if actual prices stray far from fundamentals 
for long periods. We attempt to find out whether there is any relationship between market 
returns and performance of composite index. This is done by grouping rolling 1-year periods 
in terms of returns of S&P ASX 200 and finding out that over how many such periods the 
composite index returns are greater than those of the S&P ASX 200.  
Table 4 reports the composite index wins over the cap-weighted index. It is clear that 
fundamental index wins are more frequent as market returns decrease.  In other words, the 
composite fundamental index consistently adds value in downward markets while value is 
added only about half the time in very strong market environments when returns are above 
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20%. However, one has to be mindful that number of rolling 1-year periods of such high 
returns is not trivial. In fact, they are nearly a third of all rolling 1-year periods between 
1985 and 2010. 
We also analyse the periods of outperformance and underperformance of the composite 
index during the sub-sample period. Figure 1 depicts the excess return of the composite 
index over the comparable reference index on a rolling 1-year basis from 1993 to 2010. Two 
distinct periods of extended underperformance against the reference portfolio are observed: 
January-September 2000 and October 2004-November 2006. The first period of 
underperformance comes at the height of the “tech bubble”, which is consistent with 
findings of past studies. This period was a strong growth period when the cap-weighted 
index by its very construction benefitted by putting more weight into stocks whose price 
increased at a greater pace than the rest of the market. The second period of 
underperformance is also recorded during a prolonged growth phase in the stock market. 
Figure 2 shows excess return of the fundamental index on a 5-year rolling basis. In this case, 
any underperformance of the fundamental index is completely eliminated. The excess 
returns of the composite index in this case are always observed to be positive. Whilst based 
on data over a brief sample period of 17 years it would be inappropriate to conclude that 
such excess returns would exist in the future, this certainly lends support to the argument 
that investors with longer horizon would find the composite fundamental index more 
appealing over the cap-weighted index. 
4.2 Robustness Check 
To test the robustness of the outperformance using this methodology, we do three robustness 
checks for our results under varying economic and market conditions. First, we look into the 
performance of fundamental indexes relative to cap-weighted indexes over the contraction 
and expansion phases of the business cycle. These phases are defined in accordance with the 
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identification of peaks and troughs of business cycles by months reported by Melbourne 
Institute (2010). The months from a peak to nearest future trough are included as contraction 
phase and those from trough to next peak as expansion phase. Second, relative performance 
over rising (bull) and falling (bear) markets is examined. A rising or falling market, for the 
purposes of this study, is simply characterised by a period of prolonged positive (negative) 
return in the stock market which results in a gain (loss) of over 15%. Finally, we compare 
relative performance over periods of rising and falling interest rates. An increase (decrease) 
by 100 basis points in the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) cash rate from the previous 
low (high) within a year is considered as rising (falling) interest rate regimes. Prior to the 
RBA’s targeting of cash rates, a 3-month rolling average is used to determine periods of 
rising and falling rates. The results are presented in table 5. 
Results in Panel A show that each of the individual fundamental indexes as well as the 
composite index outperformed the S&P/ASX 200 in both phases of the business cycle. 
However, there is variation in the extent of outperformance in the two phases. Whilst most 
of the individual indexes achieved statistically significant excess returns over the cap-
weighted index in expansion phase of the business cycle, this is not the case during the 
contraction phase. Only fundamental indexes based on net sales and operating income have 
significantly superior returns during these periods. Unsurprisingly, these indexes also have 
the highest Sharpe ratios. Dividend based indexes, on the other hand, performe the best 
among all indexes during expansions. But during contraction phase, like many other 
indexes, they result in negative Sharpe ratios. However, the composite indexes have positive 
Sharpe measures during both phases of the business cycle.  
Panel B shows the performance of the fundamental and the cap-weighted indexes in bullish 
and bearish conditions in the equity markets. Bull (Bear) markets are typically characterised 
by extremely high (low) returns and low (high) volatilities. Under bullish market conditions, 
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the individual fundamental indexes generally deliver higher returns as S&P/ ASX 200 with 
similar volatilities. However, the superior performance is not significant in most cases. In 
contrast, under bearish market conditions, more individual indexes like those based on 
dividends, employees and net sales outperform the cap-weighted index on a statistically 
significant basis. The composite index outperforms the cap-weighted index under both 
bullish and bearish stock market conditions. The cap-weighted index has the higher 
volatility than any of the individual as well as the composite fundamental indexes during 
bearish market conditions.8 
Panel C reports the results of the relative performance of the indexes over environments of 
falling and rising interest rates. All indexes record much higher returns and volatilities 
during falling interest rate environments compared to those witnessed when interest rates are 
rising. All the individual fundamental indexes outperform the S&P/ASX 200 under both 
regimes. Yet there was striking difference in statistical significance of the results in rising 
and falling interest rate environments. The superior performance of the individual 
fundamental indexes is significant in increasing interest rate environments while all the 
indexes outperform S&P/ASX 200 at 1% significance level when interest rates plummet. 
The composite fundamental index produced higher returns than the cap-weighted index 
under different business and market cycles. We test whether such positive excess returns are 
regime dependent i.e. significantly different under varying conditions by regressing the 
excess returns against the dummy variables representing those conditions. Specifically, we 
estimate the following model.  
      	
  	  	 
	 !"   (1) 
                                                             
8 This higher volatility has perversely resulted in a higher Sharpe ratio for the cap-weighted index as the excess 
returns over risk free rate are negative in bear markets. 
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where  and  are the monthly returns from composite fundamental index and cap-
weighted index respectively, Expansion is the dummy variable for business cycle that takes 
a value of 1 for expansionary phase and 0 otherwise, Neutral and Bearish are dummy 
variables for stock market conditions which take the value of 1 if condition is neutral or 
bearish respectively and 0 otherwise, Decreasing is the dummy variable for interest rate 
regime which takes the value of 1 for decreasing regime and 0 otherwise. Thus, the 
contraction phase of the business cycle, bull market, and increasing interest rate regime 
serve as the reference categories. We estimate all the β-coefficients individually as well as 
jointly and report them in table 6.  
The results show that the excess returns generated by the fundamental index are 
significantly higher in a decreasing interest rate regime, even after controlling for business 
cycle and stock market conditions. This result is as per expectation as we showed in table 5 
that the excess returns were strongly significant in a decreasing interest rate environment but 
not significant otherwise. We do not find the excess returns during business expansion and 
contraction phases or during bullish and bearish stock market conditions to be significantly 
different. The signs of the coefficients, however, are expectedly positive during both 
business expansionary phase and bearish market condition.  
 4.3 Factor Characteristics 
Having established the superior performance of fundamental indexation among Australian 
equities over our sample period, we turn to examine the well-known risk factors and 
anomalies in finance literature- market, value, size and momentum - that could explain the 
excess returns. This is important to identify the source of outperformance i.e. whether the 
excess returns of fundamental indexes over the cap-weighted index could be explained by 
these risk factors. Initially the following regression is done for the fundamental index 
following Jensen (1968): 
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 	$ 	  	%& 	$' 	(                (2) 
Where  is the monthly return on the fundamental index,  $ is the one month interbank 
borrowing rate and & is the monthly return on the cap-weighted index. The Jensen’s alpha 
is given by  which gives the excess return of fundamental index that is unexplained by the 
excess return of the cap-weighted market index. 
Second, we apply the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) to regress returns of the 
fundamental index to allow for risk adjustment after controlling for ‘size’ and ‘value’ 
factors. 
 	$ 	  	%& 	$'  ) . +,  - . .,/ 	(                   (3) 
In addition to the excess return of market index as in (1), the 3-factor model captures the 
excess return of small stocks over large stocks (SMB) and that of value stocks over growth 
stocks (HML). We proxy the SMB return by the return difference between monthly returns 
of ASX Small Ordinaries and ASX 100 index. We use the monthly HML data for Australia 
available on Ken French’s website.  
Finally, we employ the 4-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) where the Fama-French 
3-factor model is extended by inclusion of the momentum (MOM) factor. This is given by 
 	$ 	  	%& 	$'  ) . +,  - . .,/  0 . ,1, 	(         (4) 
The MOM factor captures the persistence of returns and is computed by the return 
differentials between the winners and the loser stocks in the recent past. We follow 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to construct momentum portfolios using monthly returns data 
from CRIF database. Stocks listed in the ASX are grouped into quintiles where the top 
quintile consists of best performers (winners) and the bottom quintile contains worst 
performers (losers) during past 6 months. Monthly returns are calculated by entering a long 
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position in an equally weighted portfolio of winners and a short position in an equally 
weighted loser portfolio.9 
Table 7 reports the results of the regressions using 1, 3, and 4 factors respectively for the 
composite index.10 We also include the result of the 4-factor regression for the cap-weighted 
reference index. All the regressions are conducted with data from April 1993 onwards due 
to unavailability of data for all the factors prior to 1993. 
The R-Square value of the composite index is about 88% for all the three models showing 
that each of these models do a good job of explaining the variation of excess returns of 
fundamental indexes. For the cap-weighted reference index, the 4-factor model has even 
higher explanatory power (above 93%). The market factor is significant in all the models at 
1%. The market beta coefficients indicate that the composite index bears slightly less 
systematic risk than the overall market. Again, the magnitude of the beta coefficient for the 
composite index is slightly lower than that for the cap-weighted index which has a beta very 
close to 1. Hence, fundamental index returns could not be distinguished from cap-weighted 
index returns based on the market factor. 
Of the other three, the size (SMB) factor appears to have no significant relationship with the 
composite index. This may be surprising considering the expectation that the fundamental 
index would display a bias towards small stocks in comparison to a cap-weighted index. The 
relationship of the size factor with the reference portfolio is significant but negative.11 This 
would suggest that the cap-weighted index returns are more closely correlated with large 
stocks returns than small stocks returns. Like Mar et al. (2009), we find a significant value 
                                                             
9 Due to differential rates of return accruing to different portfolios, the momentum portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) throughout the holding period to maintain an equal 
weighting. 
10 Results for regression of individual indexes are available from the authors on request. 
11 The size premium during our full sample period was negative. Past studies of the Australian market present 
conflicting results on the existence of the size premium. Some find evidence of a positive premium (e.g. Gaunt 
(2004)) while others report negative premium (e.g. Faff (2001). Most of them indicate the evidence on size 
factor is weaker compared to US market. 
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bias in the cap-weighted index. However, unlike their study, the value (HML) factor is 
significant only in the 3-factor model but not in the 4-factor model. The coefficient of the 
momentum factor is negative and significant. Mar et al. (2009) and Stotz, Döhnert, and 
Wanzenried (2010) also report a negative momentum coefficient that could be a result of the 
contrarian nature of the fundamental indexation strategy. Interestingly, the momentum 
factor also displays a negative relationship with the reference portfolio although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is half that of the composite index. 
The alpha coefficients for the composite index are quite revealing. The alphas are similar for 
the models with 1, 3, and 4 factors, which suggests that the additional risk factors do little to 
explain the excess returns of the fundamental index. The alphas for the composite index are 
significantly positive in all the models and show that the fundamental index is able to 
generate excess return that is not attributable to any of the 4 factors in the Carhart model. 
This contradicts the earlier findings of Mar et al. (2009) who reported that fundamental 
index superiority over cap-weighted index in Australia was largely attributable to value bias 
and the alpha was insignificant after controlling for the 4 factors.12  
To test further how the returns from fundamental indexes compare to that of a simple value 
portfolio, we rank all stocks based on a commonly used valuation measure –the book-to-
market ratio. A value-weighted portfolio is formed comprising of stocks ranked in the top 
quartile. The geometric return of this value portfolio over our full sample period was found 
to be 14.93% and with a volatility of annual returns equal to 18.6%. For the sub-sample 
period, geometric return and volatility were 13.46% and 15.88% respectively.
13
 We also 
                                                             
12 The AHM (2005) study found positive alpha for fundamental index in the US market but they used a single 
factor model only.  
13
 We also compute returns and volatilities over the full sample (and sub-sample period) using Ken French’s 
Australian returns data ‘book-to-market’ portfolio as well as portfolios based on few other valuation multiples 
like ‘earnings-to-price’ and ‘dividend yield’ (i.e. dividend-to-price). The estimates for his high ‘book-to-
market’ portfolio were close to ours: geometric return of 14.88% (and 13.19%) and standard deviation of 
18.33% (and 15.39%). All these portfolios were outperformed by composite fundamental index in terms of 
their Sharpe ratios. 
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look at the performance of the well-known MSCI Australia Value Index. Over our full 
sample period, MSCI Australia Value Index had a geometric return of 13.29% and volatility 
of 16.89%. The corresponding estimates over the sub-sample period were 11.47% and 
14.53% respectively. Like the fundamental indexes, both the ‘book-to-market’ portfolio and 
the MSCI Australia Value Index outperform the cap-weighted index in terms of returns, 
albeit with higher volatilities. However, their performances fall well short of average 
fundamental index in our study both in terms of returns and volatility over the full and sub-
sample periods.  
 4.4 Portfolio Holdings Comparison 
We scrutinise the variation of allocation to different sectors over time for both the cap-
weighted and fundamental composite index portfolios. Similar to Hsu and Campollo (2006), 
composite index holdings is compared with the cap-weighted reference portfolio at a sector 
level on a rolling 1-year basis. Quarterly sector allocation is calculated through Factset using 
the Factset sector groupings.  
The original AHM study and Hsu and Campollo (2006) take a look at the sector weights of 
the fundamental index portfolio through time against that of the cap-weighted index. The 
authors illustrate the more static nature of the sector allocation of the fundamental index 
methodology, as it rebalances out of sectors that have performed well (such as technology 
sector during late 1990s) rather than increasing weight as price increases. Figure 3 shows 
the rolling 1-year sector weights for the composite and the cap-weighted reference index. 
The sector allocation for composite fundamental index seems to be more stable than that of 
cap-weighted index over time.14 Therefore, the Australian evidence appears to be in line 
with the findings of the above studies.  
                                                             
14 Large changes in sector allocation within the composite fundamental index (and reference index) are 
primarily driven by entry or exit of large companies. For example, the Telecommunications sector saw a large 
boost in the 1998 rebalance, as Telstra (TLS) listed towards the end of the previous year. In the March 1998 
rebalance, it was ranked first on fundamentals in the composite portfolio and given a weight of 7.35%. 
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4.5 Turnover 
All the index portfolios are back-tested for turnover. Each portfolio is price drifted from the 
date of reconstitution (31 March) until the date of the following reconstitution. Turnover is 
calculated as the difference between the holdings of the price-drifted 31 March portfolio and 
the rebalanced portfolio. One-way turnover is quoted in the results as, without cash flows, 
buys and sells are the same. The AHM study examined the reduction in excess return, 
assuming a 2% transaction cost (of that magnitude to include both transaction fees and price 
impact). Similarly, we look at excess return assuming 2% transaction costs that we calculate 
as follows: 
	!	  2	!	  34	45	6	 7 	2% (4) 
We also compute the magnitude of the transaction cost that is required to be incurred before 
excess returns from fundamental index are completely eroded. We call this the threshold 
transaction cost which is given by: 
3:	;  	!		 < 34	45	6   (5) 
Table 8 presents the average portfolio turnover for the different indexes. The results show 
that the portfolio turnovers for fundamental indexes are, as per expectation, much higher 
than the cap-weighted reference index. However, they certainly seem to be lower in 
comparison to actively managed portfolios. Also the AHM study and subsequent papers like 
Arnott and West (2006) found that by using trailing average data for construction of 
fundamental indexes, rather than the latest data, turnover was minimised. We find that it is 
indeed the case. 
Higher turnover for any of the fundamental index portfolios obviously would result in 
higher transaction costs compared to the reference portfolio. The critical question here, 
however, is whether the transaction cost differences are large enough to neutralise the 
excess returns of the former over the latter. Table 9 shows excess return under the condition 
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of 2% transaction costs (including market impact) assuming a flat fee across all buy and sell 
orders. Such transaction costs, we find, decrease the excess return of the composite index by 
52 basis points bringing them down to 2.54% per annum. Remarkably, all the fundamental 
indexes are still able to achieve an excess return over the reference index after adjusting for 
transaction costs. 
From the above results, it appears that transaction costs need to be far larger than 2% in 
order to make an investor indifferent in choosing between fundamental index and a cap-
weighted index. How large transaction costs need to be in order to erode excess return of the 
fundamental index over the reference index? We estimate these for different fundamental 
indexes and report the same in table 10. The results suggest that transaction costs have to be 
substantially larger to nullify the superior performance of the fundamental indexes. For 
individual indexes, they have to be as high as 15.82% (almost 8 times our assumed level) for 
an indexation strategy based on net sales. Even for a strategy based on operating income, the 
least successful of the fundamental measures in our study, transaction costs would have to 
increase by more than 200% to erode all excess returns over the cap-weighted index. For the 
composite index, the costs have to go up by nearly 500% to bring the returns at par with the 
cap-weighted index. These results indicate that fundamental indexation’s superiority over 
cap-weighted indexation is likely to prevail even in presence of transaction costs unless they 
are set at an unrealistically high level.15 
5. Conclusion 
We have examined fundamental indexation in the Australian market, primarily focussing on 
whether this portfolio construction methodology adds value over traditional cap-weighted 
                                                             
15 In discussing transaction costs and turnover of the composite fundamental Index, Arnott and West (2006) 
makes this pertinent point that the composite’s turnover tends to be in larger-capitalisation issues that have 
witnessed changes in their fundamentals while the turnover of cap-weighted portfolios are mostly related to the 
smaller companies (higher transaction costs) that fall off or step into the cap-weighted list. The former’s 
reweighting of larger securities is likely to involve smaller transaction costs compared to the latter. 
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indexing. We found that indexes based on accounting measures of size like sales, book 
value, earnings, and cash flow outperformed the cap-weighted index with similar or lower 
volatility. Similarly, the composite fundamental index formed by combining the individual 
fundamental measures was found to outperform the reference index by over 350 basis points 
with lower volatility. Robustness checks confirmed the outperformance across varying 
market conditions. Statistically significant excess returns, however, were not sustained in 
environments of rising stock markets and increasing interest rates. By investigating the 
periods of underperformance, we found that the composite fundamental index 
underperformed in strong bull markets and in times where prices stray from fundamentals 
for prolonged periods. However, over a rolling 5-year time period, this underperformance 
diminished. Therefore the strategy seems to hold more appeal to investors with long 
horizons. Overall, the fundamental index strategy offered a potential to outperform the cap-
weighted index by 2% and 5% per annum with similar volatility over rolling 5-year periods.  
Due to the higher turnover of stocks compared to the cap-weighted index, transaction costs 
could act as a potential deterrent for executing fundamental indexation strategies. However, 
we found such concern to be unfounded as all the indexes maintained their outperformance 
even when 2% transaction costs were taken into account. Our results indicate that the 
transaction costs need to increase to unrealistic levels to nullify the return advantage of 
fundamental indexation over cap-weighted indexation.  
The superior performance of fundamental index in our study is not fully explained by value, 
size, or momentum factors. This result is significant as many researchers have suggested 
that the outperformance of the fundamental Index could be entirely attributed to these 
stylised factors, particularly value. By using a reasonably long sample period of 25 years, 
which included significant market upswings and downturns, we found that the excess 
returns from fundamental indexation were not achieved entirely on the back of the value 
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premium. There are two ways to explain this phenomenon based on selection and weighting 
of stocks within the fundamental index. First, Piotroski (2000) demonstrates that within the 
universe of ‘value’ (i.e. high book-to-market) stocks, there is significant difference in 
performance between stocks of stronger and weaker companies categorised by a number of 
fundamental measures. The composite fundamental index in our paper selects and weights 
stocks based on a range of accounting (or fundamental) measures. Arguably, this stock 
selection and weighting mechanism results in the creation of a ‘stronger’ value portfolio 
than one constructed purely on the basis of ‘book-to-market’ ratio, which being a price-
dependent measure, ignores growth stocks with rapidly improving fundamentals like 
growing sales, operating profits, and dividends. Second, as Arnott, Hsu, and West (2008) 
points out, the fundamental index has a ‘dynamic’ value tilt that changes its weightings to 
growth and value stocks with their changing relative market valuations. In periods when the 
market pays larger premium for growth, the value tilt of the fundamental index increases. 
Likewise, when the premium for growth shrinks, the value tilt of the fundamental index 
becomes smaller. As a result, the gains made by the fundamental index in a value market are 
typically more than its losses in a growth market. The excess returns of the fundamental 
index over the cap-weighted index are driven in large parts by these dynamic shifts in 
weighting of stocks and sectors within the portfolio and not merely by capturing the value 
premium. 
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Net Sales - Latest 16.59% $ 46.44 16.02% 0.48 4.84% 3.91* 
Net Sales - 3 year 17.14% $ 52.22 15.97% 0.52 5.39% 4.43* 
Net Sales - 5 year 17.64% $ 58.06 15.93% 0.55 5.88% 4.88* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 15.26% $ 34.83 16.06% 0.41 3.50% 3.04* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year 15.66% $ 37.99 16.05% 0.43 3.90% 3.45* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year 15.84% $ 39.49 15.91% 0.44 4.08% 3.65* 
Operating Income - Latest 15.20% $ 34.39 16.04% 0.40 3.44% 3.15* 
Operating Income - 3 year 15.72% $ 38.47 15.88% 0.44 3.96% 3.74* 
Operating Income - 5 year 15.56% $ 37.14 15.80% 0.43 3.80% 3.60* 
Dividend Paid - Latest 15.55% $ 37.09 15.17% 0.45 3.79% 2.63* 
Dividend Paid - 3 year 15.24% $ 34.67 15.11% 0.43 3.48% 2.64* 
Dividend Paid - 5 year 15.37% $ 35.65 14.97% 0.44 3.61% 2.76* 
 Net Payment - Latest 16.27% $ 43.35 15.40% 0.48 4.52% 3.13* 
Net Payment - 3 year 15.77% $ 38.86 15.47% 0.45 4.01% 3.31* 
Net Payment - 5 year 15.66% $ 38.02 15.42% 0.45 3.91% 3.37* 
Employees - Latest 16.70% $ 47.54 16.13% 0.49 4.95% 3.02* 
Employees - 3 year 16.85% $ 49.02 15.93% 0.50 5.09% 3.28* 
Employees - 5 year 16.66% $ 47.08 15.86% 0.49 4.90% 3.15* 
S&P ASX 200 Accumulation 11.76% $ 16.10 16.72% 0.19 - - 
This table reports the performance of the 18 fundamental indexes and the cap-weighted index for the full 
sample period. The excess return is given by the difference of the returns of the individual fundamental index 
and the cap-weighted index. Latest, 3 year and 5 year denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by 
using a trailing average of the measure over last 1, 3, and 5 years respectively. * indicates significance of 
































Net Sales - Latest 15.67% $ 11.87 13.34% 0.48 4.49% 3.77** 
Net Sales - 3 year 16.34% $ 13.11 13.17% 0.52 5.17% 4.17** 
Net Sales - 5 year 17.09% $ 14.61 13.17% 0.55 5.92% 4.72** 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 14.03% $  9.32 13.72% 0.39 2.86% 2.52* 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year 14.45% $  9.92 13.64% 0.41 3.28% 2.85** 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year 14.64% $ 10.21 13.43% 0.43 3.47% 3.06** 
Operating Income - Latest 13.66% $  8.82 13.30% 0.39 2.49% 2.44* 
Operating Income - 3 year 14.05% $  9.35 13.08% 0.41 2.88% 2.81** 
Operating Income - 5 year 13.78% $  8.98 13.04% 0.40 2.61% 2.57* 
Dividend Paid - Latest 14.39% $  9.83 12.87% 0.44 3.22% 2.41* 
Dividend Paid - 3 year 13.85% $  9.07 12.55% 0.42 2.68% 2.18* 
Dividend Paid - 5 year 14.06% $  9.37 12.39% 0.44 2.89% 2.33* 
Net Payment - Latest 16.40% $ 13.23 12.69% 0.54 5.23% 3.57** 
Net Payment - 3 year 14.91% $ 10.62 12.58% 0.47 3.74% 3.09** 
Net Payment - 5 year 14.65% $ 10.21 12.49% 0.46 3.47% 3.07** 
Employees - Latest 15.16% $ 11.02 12.91% 0.47 3.99% 2.55* 
Employees - 3 year 15.41% $ 11.42 12.65% 0.49 4.23% 2.67** 
Employees - 5 year 15.22% $ 11.11 12.56% 0.49 4.05% 2.52* 
Reference 11.17% $  6.05 13.42% 0.27 - - 
This table reports the performance of the 18 fundamental indexes and the cap-weighted index (Reference) for the 
sub-sample period. Excess return is given by the difference of the returns of the individual fundamental index 
and the cap-weighted index. Latest, 3 year and 5 year denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using 
a trailing average of the measure over last 1, 3, and 5 years respectively. **, * indicates significance of excess 




















of $1 Volatility 
Panel A: 1985-2010 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 15.26%***  $   34.83  16.06% 
Net Sales - 5 year 17.64%***  $   58.06  15.93% 
Operating Income - 5 year 15.56%***  $   37.14  15.80% 
Net Payment - 5 year 15.66%***  $   38.02  15.42% 
Average 16.03%  $   42.01  15.80% 
Composite 16.19%***  $   42.57  15.65% 
S&P ASX Accumulation 11.76%  $  16.10  16.72% 
 
Panel B: 1993 - 2010  
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 14.03%** $     9.32 13.72% 
Net Sales - 5 year 17.09%*** $   14.61 13.17% 
Operating Income - 5 year 13.78%** $     8.98 13.04% 
Net Payment - 5 year 14.65%*** $   10.21 12.49% 
Average 14.89% $   10.78 13.10% 
Composite 14.99%*** $   10.97 12.91% 
Reference 11.17% $    6.05 13.42% 
This table reports the performance of the composite fundamental index and its individual component 
indexes for the full sample period (Panel A) and sub-sample period (Panel B). ‘Latest’ and ‘5 year’ 
denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using a trailing average of the measure over 
last 1 and 5 years. The performance of the benchmark cap-weighted indexes is also reported in each 
case. ***, **, and * indicates significance of excess return of fundamental index over the benchmark 

































Composite fundamental index wins over S&P ASX 200 Accumulation Index  
 
Market return Composite fundamental index wins (%) 
Number of 
periods 
Greater than 30% 50% 42 
20% to 30% 47% 51 
10% to 20% 71% 75 
0% to 10% 86% 56 
-10% to 0% 91% 34 
-20% to -10% 89% 18 
Less than -20% 100% 13 
This table shows the percentage of 1-year rolling return periods within our full sample period in which 
returns of the composite fundamental index were higher than that of the benchmark cap-weighted index. 























Fundamental index performance in different economic and market conditions  
 





Ratio Return Volatility 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Net Sales - Latest 20.85%* 16.97% 0.55 10.49%** 14.38% 0.07 
Net Sales - 3 year 20.90%** 16.94% 0.56 11.73%*** 14.33%        0.15 
Net Sales - 5 year 21.87%*** 16.96% 0.63 11.57%** 14.18% 0.14 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 19.67%* 17.13% 0.48 8.95% 14.19% -0.02 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 3 year 20.24%** 17.22% 0.51 9.11% 13.98% -0.01 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5 year 20.30%** 17.17% 0.52 9.46% 13.68% 0.01 
Operating Income - Latest 18.51%** 17.14% 0.52 10.41%** 14.19% 0.07 
Operating Income - 3 year 19.52%** 16.95% 0.56 10.25%** 14.05% 0.06 
Operating Income - 5 year 19.33%** 16.97% 0.56 10.12%** 13.80% 0.05 
Dividend Paid - Latest 20.12%** 16.11% 0.61 9.01% 13.52% -0.02 
Dividend Paid - 3 year 19.75%** 16.12% 0.58 8.79% 13.31% -0.03 
Dividend Paid - 5 year 19.73%** 16.03% 0.58 9.12% 13.09% -0.01 
Net Payment - Latest 20.74%** 16.48% 0.65 9.88% 13.49% 0.03 
Net Payment - 3 year 20.41%** 16.54% 0.60 9.13% 13.59% -0.01 
Net Payment - 5 year 20.34%** 16.52% 0.61 8.98% 13.45% -0.02 
Employees - Latest 20.26% 16.79% 0.50 11.56%* 15.05% 0.13 
Employees - 3 year 20.89%* 16.66% 0.54 11.03% 14.69% 0.10 
Employees - 5 year 20.57% 16.62% 0.52 11.02% 14.59% 0.10 
Composite 20.22%*** 16.78% 0.58 10.39%** 13.69% 0.07 
S&P ASX 200 Accumulation 14.81% 18.12% 0.26 7.33% 14.32% -0.12 
 
Panel B: Rising and falling stock markets  
  Bull Markets  Bear Markets  
  Return Volatility 
Sharpe 
Ratio Return Volatility 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Net Sales - Latest 62.10% 10.90% 15.64 -35.82%* 21.81% -6.45 
Net Sales – 3 year 61.92% 10.76% 15.82 -36.03%** 22.28% -6.35 
Net Sales – 5 year 61.88% 10.80% 15.74 -35.84%** 22.23% -6.33 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 60.29% 11.09% 14.82 -36.65% 22.21% -6.46 
Book Value ex Intangibles – 3 year 60.66% 11.16% 14.85 -36.18% 22.32% -6.37 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5year 60.46% 11.07% 14.91 -35.43%* 22.12% -6.31 
Operating Income - Latest 59.20% 10.67% 15.18 -37.50% 22.26% -6.57 
Operating Income – 3 year 60.05%** 10.73% 15.38 -36.50% 21.72% -6.59 
Operating Income – 5 year 59.43%* 10.74% 15.17 -36.30% 21.54% -6.62 
Dividend Paid - Latest 58.16% 10.82% 14.57 -33.92%* 19.81% -6.79 
Dividend Paid – 3 year 57.60% 10.58% 14.78 -34.30%** 20.15% -6.75 
Dividend Paid – 5 year 57.31% 10.47% 14.84 -33.52%** 20.00% -6.67 
Net Payment - Latest 60.54% 11.13% 14.91 -32.32%*** 20.04% -6.45 
Net Payment – 3 year 60.04% 11.02% 14.94 -34.48%** 21.03% -6.48 
Net Payment – 5 year 59.45% 10.97% 14.86 -34.24%** 20.88% -6.50 
Employees - Latest 60.57% 11.69% 14.17 -35.03%* 20.92% -6.60 
Employees – 3 year 61.03% 11.52% 14.51 -34.63%* 21.24% -6.45 
Employees – 5 year 60.63% 11.52% 14.42 -34.51%* 21.28% -6.42 
Composite 60.32% 10.65% 15.52 -35.58%** 21.64% -6.47 
S&P ASX 200 Accumulation 55.23% 10.44% 14.42 -40.36% 25.40% -6.13 
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Panel C: Increasing and decreasing interest rate environments  
  Increasing Decreasing 
  Return Volatility 
Sharpe 
ratio Return Volatility 
Sharpe 
ratio 
Net Sales - Latest 12.59% 11.80% 0.41 20.41%*** 19.07% 0.55 
Net Sales - 3yr 13.45% 11.75% 0.48 20.65%*** 19.03% 0.56 
Net Sales - 5yr 13.23% 11.66% 0.47 21.86%*** 19.01% 0.62 
Book Value ex Intangibles - Latest 11.94% 11.62% 0.36 18.41%*** 19.26% 0.45 
Book Value ex Intangibles – 3 year 12.17% 11.53% 0.38 18.98%*** 19.29% 0.48 
Book Value ex Intangibles - 5year 12.21% 11.40% 0.39 19.30%*** 19.13% 0.49 
Operating Income - Latest 12.23% 12.42% 0.36 18.01%*** 18.77% 0.44 
Operating Income – 3 year 12.58% 12.23% 0.40 18.70%*** 18.62% 0.48 
Operating Income – 5 year 12.17% 12.19% 0.37 18.78%*** 18.52% 0.49 
Dividend Paid - Latest 11.44% 11.17% 0.34 19.48%*** 18.07% 0.53 
Dividend Paid – 3 year 11.22% 11.07% 0.32 19.08%*** 18.02% 0.51 
Dividend Paid – 5 year 11.30% 10.99% 0.33 19.25%*** 17.83% 0.53 
Net Payment - Latest 12.29% 11.48% 0.40 20.07%*** 18.26% 0.56 
Net Payment – 3 year 12.15% 11.47% 0.38 19.21%*** 18.39% 0.51 
Net Payment – 5 year 11.90% 11.45% 0.36 19.26%*** 18.31% 0.52 
Employees - Latest 13.17% 12.18% 0.44 20.07%*** 19.05% 0.53 
Employees – 3 year 13.12% 11.91% 0.45 20.39%*** 18.88% 0.56 
Employees – 5 year 12.98% 11.78% 0.44 20.16%*** 18.85% 0.55 
Composite 12.69% 11.61% 0.42 19.52%*** 18.60% 0.52 
S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation 10.82% 12.17% 0.26 12.63% 20.05% 0.17 
This table reports the performance of the individual and composite fundamental indexes as well as the 
benchmark cap-weighted index for the full sample period for different economic and stock market cycles. 
Latest, 3 year and 5 year denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using a trailing average of the 
measure over last 1, 3, and 5 years respectively. ***, **, and * indicates significance of excess returns of 




























Business cycle  
Expansion 
Stock market Interest rate 
Decreasing Neutral Bearish 
 













   0.0033* 
(2.3731) 
 














This table reports the coefficients from the time series regressions of excess returns of 
composite fundamental index against different macroeconomic regimes as represented by 


























Factor characteristics of composite fundamental index 
 













































This table shows the regression results of composite fundamental index returns against the factors as 
represented by Equations (2), (3) and (4). The regression result for the benchmark cap-weighted index is also 
reported for comparison. The t-statistics are shown within parentheses. **, * indicates significance at 1% and 



















 Average portfolio turnover of fundamental indexes 
 
  Latest 3 Year 5 Year 
Net Sales 14.21% 13.08% 12.56% 
Book Value ex Intangibles 15.88% 13.47% 12.77% 
Operating Income 19.20% 13.87% 12.00% 
Dividend Paid 20.47% 13.84% 12.44% 
Net Payment 36.03% 18.21% 15.07% 
Employees 17.70% 13.94% 12.09% 
Composite 12.91% 
  Reference 8.64% 
This table presents the average portfolio turnover of different fundamental indexes 
and benchmark cap weighted index between 1993 and 2010. Latest, 3 year, and 5 year 
denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using a trailing average of the 
measure over last 1, 3 and 5 years respectively. Turnover is calculated as the 
difference between the holdings of the price-drifted portfolio constituted every year 

















Net excess return of fundamental indexes 
 
  Latest 3 year 5 year 
Net Sales 3.93% 4.65% 5.42% 
Book Value ex Intangibles 2.23% 2.74% 2.96% 
Operating Income 1.72% 2.33% 2.13% 
Dividend Paid 2.40% 2.12% 2.40% 
Net Payment 3.79% 3.01% 2.87% 
Employees 3.28% 3.68% 3.56% 
Composite 2.54%     
This table shows the net excess return of different fundamental indexes as 
represented by Equation (4) between 1993 and 2010 under the assumption 
of 2% transaction costs for both buy and sale transactions. Latest, 3 year, 
and 5 year denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using 

















Threshold transaction costs for fundamental indexes 
 
  Latest 3 Year 5 Year 
Net Sales 15.82% 19.77% 23.55% 
Book Value ex Intangibles 9.02% 12.18% 13.59% 
Operating Income 6.49% 10.39% 10.87% 
Dividend Paid 7.87% 9.67% 11.62% 
Net Payment 7.26% 10.27% 11.53% 
Employees 11.28% 15.19% 16.74% 
Composite 11.85% 
  This table shows the magnitude of the transaction cost required to erode excess 
returns of fundamental index over the benchmark cap-weighted portfolio 
between 1993 and 2010 as represented by Equation (5). Latest, 3 year and 5 
year denotes that the respective portfolios were formed by using trailing 

























 Figure 1 Composite fundamental index 1-year rolling excess returns. This figure presents 1-year 
 rolling excess returns of the composite fundamental index over the cap weighted reference 





































Figure 2 Composite fundamental index 5-year rolling excess returns. This figure presents 5-year rolling excess 




































































































































































Figure 3: Sectoral allocation of fundamental and cap-weighted index. The figure shows rolling 1-year sectoral weights of composite fundamental index and cap-
weighted reference portfolio between 1993 and 2010.
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